Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse (...) traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. (shrink)

Brownlee rethinks human rights theory to reflect the fact that we are deeply social creatures. Our core social needs, for meaningful social inclusion, are more important than, and essential to, our civil, political, and economic needs. This grounds a right against social deprivation and a right to the resources to sustain other people.

This chapter explores the contours of our freedoms to enter into and leave particular associations with particular people. The chapter highlights the fact that often our associations with each other are morally complex and, indeed, morally wrong. This moral complexity stems partly from the fact that associations are necessarily intersubjective: they affect the social needs, claims, and freedoms of at least two people. When our associations are morally wrong, we must determine whether they can be protected nonetheless by our sphere (...) of associative freedom. The chapter shows that our sphere of associative freedom depends greatly on the character and consequences of our associations (or dissociations). The chapter also shows that, under certain conditions, freedom of association is less important than other associative rights, such as the positive associative claim‐rights of utterly dependent people. (shrink)

Ordinary interactions are the primary vehicle through which we show respect, give social pleasure, and grease the wheels of healthy sociality. When we do an interactional wrong to someone, we not only convey disrespect by disregarding their interactional needs, but also cause them social pain and erode healthy social relations. Interactional ethics – the study of the ethics of interacting – concerns both our conduct within our interactions and our broader interactional style. The existing philosophical literature in this area has (...) not yet provided a detailed analysis of the three discrete stages of an ordinary interaction – the initiation stage, the execution stage, and the conclusion stage – or of the specific wrongs beyond disrespect that we can do at each stage. This article develops novel and useful tools to analyse interactional wrongs that both compromise our wellbeing by causing us social pain and threaten healthy sociality. It then distinguishes various patterns of interactional wrongdoing – i.e. interactional vices – that we can manifest as we seek to control with whom we interact and how. (shrink)

Despite worries about paternalism, when we are unjustifiably attacked, we are morally warranted, and sometimes required, to act in self-defense for the sake of our attacker to prevent him from committing this morally defiling act. Similarly, when a third party is unjustifiably attacked and we can assist without undue cost, we are morally warranted, and sometimes required, to act in third-party defense for the sake of the attacker as well as the victim, to prevent the attacker from committing this morally (...) defiling act. The case for these claims can be extended to national defense and humanitarian intervention. (shrink)

There is a tension between our need for associative control and our need for social connections. This tension creates ethical dilemmas that we can call each-we dilemmas of sociability. To resolve these dilemmas, we must prioritize either negative moral rights to dissociate or positive moral rights to social inclusion. This article shows that we must prioritize positive social rights. This has implications both for personal morality and for political theory. As persons, we must attend to each other's basic social needs. (...) As a society, we must adopt a sufficientarian approach to the regulation of social resources. (shrink)

My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral (...) concepts such as duty, virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal formoral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility. (shrink)

This article challenges the use of social deprivation as a punishment, and offers a preliminary examination of the human rights implications of exile and solitary confinement. The article considers whether a human right against coercive social deprivation is conceptually redundant, as there are recognised rights against torture, extremely cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment as well as rights to basic health care, education, and security, which might encompass what this right protects. The article argues that the right is not conceptually redundant, (...) but that, even if it were, there would be significant reasons to articulate it. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies , by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to (...) do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends. (shrink)

This article shows that associative freedom is not what we tend to think it is. Contrary to standard liberal thinking, it is neither a general moral permission to choose the society most acceptable to us nor a content-insensitive claim-right akin to the other personal freedoms with which it is usually lumped such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. It is at most (i) a highly restricted moral permission to associate subject to constraints of consent, necessity and burdensomeness; (ii) (...) a conditional moral permission not to associate provided our associative contributions are not required; and (iii) a highly constrained, content sensitive moral claim-right that protects only those wrongful associations that honour other legitimate concerns such as consent, need, harm and respect. This article also shows that associative freedom is not as valuable as we tend to think it is. It is secondary to positive associative claim-rights that protect our fundamental social needs and are pre-conditions for any associative control worth the name. (shrink)

A parallel may be drawn between the communicative aspect of civil disobedience and the communicative aspect of lawful punishment by the state. In punishing an offender, the state seeks to communicate both its condemnation of the crime committed and its desire for repentance and reformation on the part of the offender. Similarly, in civilly disobeying the law, a disobedient seeks to convey both her condemnation of a certain law or policy and her desire for recognition that a lasting change in (...) policy is required. When disobedients and authorities target each other, their confrontation allows for a direct comparison of the respective justifiability of their conduct. Their confrontation is explored in this paper with an eye to analysing how civil disobedients and authorities should engage with each other. (shrink)

Debates about our moral relation to the law typically focus on the moral force of law. Often, the question asked is: Do we have a moral duty to follow the law? Recently, that question has been given a virtue-ethical formulation: Is there a virtue in abiding by the law? This paper considers our moral relation to the law in terms of virtue but focuses on a different question from the traditional ones. The question here is: Can the law model virtue (...) in beneficial ways that enable us to cultivate virtue? This paper shows that the law can do this by setting a moral example that we have good reason to emulate. This is significant given the distinctive influence the law has over our lives. The paper begins by examining the nature of a model, comparing different models of virtue, and then questions the possibility of a complete model of virtue such as the so-called Virtuous Person. The paper then articulates several ways in which the law can model virtue for us and responds to three objections: 1) the embodiment problem, 2) the poisoning problem, and 3) the emulation problem. (shrink)

Pfeiffer, Kimberley We've heard it happening more than once. A couple uses IVF to fall pregnant then later down the track they conceive naturally. Confusing, right? Aren't they supposed to be infertile? Isn't that why people request this invasive and expensive procedure in the first place? Well, a recent study shows that more than 40% of women aged between 28 and 36 years that report having a history of infertility achieved subsequent births without using any form of reproductive assistance1. (...) Which raises the question, what does it mean to be infertile? (shrink)

In 1974, the United States Congress asked a question prompting a national conversation about ethics: which ethical principles should govern research involving human participants? To embark on an answer, Congress passed the National Research Act, and charged this task to the newly established National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission’s mandate was modest however, the results were anything but. The outcome was The Belmont Report: a trio of principles - respect for persons, (...) beneficence, and justice - serving as an ethical compass for scientists, researchers, and institutional review boards (IRBs). Almost 50 years later, the utility, legacy, and ingenuity of The Belmont Report continues to be both admired and challenged. Critics argue that Belmont is not fit for the 21st century, while supporters praise Belmont for its enduring wisdom. The goal of this paper is to equip IRB practitioners with the tools necessary to maximally interpret The Belmont Report and meaningfully engage in ethical analysis that reconsiders outmoded legacy thinking and fixed decision-making. Through historical and contextual reflection, this paper describes how IRB practitioners can contemporize review of ethical human research using their moral imagination – a skill found at the intersection of creativity, deliberation, and empathy. (shrink)

This article responds to the four contributors to the book symposium on Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience. Those four contributors are Thomas Hill Jr, David Lefkowitz, William Smith, and Daniel Weinstock. Hill examines the concepts of conviction and conscience ; Smith discusses conviction and then analyses the right to civil disobedience and my humanistic arguments for it ; Weinstock explores democratic challenges for civil disobedience ; and Lefkowitz assesses the merits of a legal demands-of-conviction excuse for civil (...) disobedience. This ‘Reply to Critics’ addresses them in turn. (shrink)

We face an epistemic problem in competently judging some types of experience. The problem arises when an experience either defies our efforts to assess its quality, such as a traumatic event, or compromises our abilities to assess quality in general, such as starvation. In the latter type of case, the competent judge problem is actually a paradox since the experience undermines our competence to judge at the same time that it gives us competence to judge it against other experiences. The (...) problem is pressing because it arises for experiences at the more extreme ends of the spectrum, which are precisely the experiences we most want to judge competently. It also has implications for how we approach some practical ethical problems, such as solitary confinement. The paper explores a range of cases and explains why efforts to escape the competent judge problem may prove fruitless. (shrink)

Since antiquity, there had been close ties between imagined movement through built spaces and organising knowledge. Philosophers and rhetorical theorists had argued that one remembered most effectively by imagining a sequence of places, including built spaces, and storing images of what should be recalled in those places. Authors of medieval pilgrimage narratives had led their readers on tours of sacred sites beginning in the twelfth century. From the late fifteenth century, however, imagined movement became more insistently physical and increasingly deployed (...) to communicate, rather than simply store, knowledge: built memory spaces were for the first time categorised according to size; volumes began to present pre-designed memory structures devoted to a particular topic; guidebooks to Rome started to lead readers on tours similar to those of pilgrimage narratives; and university botanic gardens offered the lived equivalent of sequences of memory places. By the seventeenth century, tours with sequences of spaces that stored information were a familiar technique across discourses from natural philosophy to architecture. This article examines the increasing physicality of imagined movement through these spaces and its connection to communicating knowledge as well as to shaping the attitudes of readers. I focus on mnemonic treatises and volumes presenting pre-designed spaces, the books where imagined movement was especially apparent, alongside guidebooks and botanic gardens. Consequently, built memory spaces, which have been little studied, are highlighted, and two rich but usually discrete strands of early modern history are brought together: history of memory and studies of movement through the built environment. (shrink)

The criminal law raises wonderfully thorny foundational questions. Some of these questions are conceptual: What is a plausible conception of crime ? What is a plausible conception of criminal law ? Some of these questions are genealogical: What are the historical and genealogical roots of the criminal law in a particular jurisdiction? Other questions are evaluative: What are the political and moral values on which a given conception of criminal law depends? What kind of rational reconstruction, if any, could the (...) criminal law be given? And, finally, still other questions are exploratory and normative: Should parts of existing criminal law be abandoned? What new topics in criminal law theory need to be addressed in our globalised, technologically savvy world? The contributors to Antony Duff and Stuart P. Green’s collection Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law tackle these questions with zeal and independent spirit. They disagree markedly with each other about what the foundational questions are. And, they disagree about how those questions should be handled. This article charts their disagreements by situating the contributors within two taxonomies. The first groups them according to their approaches to the foundational questions; the second groups them according to their modes of theorising. This double taxonomy provides a useful frame within which to analyse these competing takes on the philosophically foundational work of criminal law theory. (shrink)

In recent years, political philosophers have hotly debated whether ordinary citizens have a general pro tanto moral obligation to follow the law. Contemporary philosophers have had less to say about the same question when applied to public officials. In this paper, I consider the latter question in the morally complex context of criminal justice. I argue that criminal justice officials have no general pro tanto moral obligation to adhere to the legal dictates and lawful rules of their offices. My claim (...) diverges not only from the commonsense view about such officials, but also from the positions standardly taken in legal theory and political science debates, which presume there is some general obligation that must arise from legal norms and be reconciled with political realities. I defend my claim by highlighting the conceptual gap between the rigid, generalised, codified rules that define a criminal justice office and the special moral responsibilities of the various moral roles that may underpin that office (such as guard, guardian, healer, educator, mediator, counsellor, advocate, and carer). After addressing four objections to my view, I consider specific contexts in which criminal justice officials are obligated not to adhere to the demands of their offices. Amongst other things, the arguments advanced in this paper raise questions about both the distribution of formal discretion in the criminal justice system and the normative validity of some of the offices that presently exist in criminal justice systems. (shrink)

Few defences of retribution in criminal justice make a plausible case for the view that punishment plays a necessary role in restoring relations between offenders, victims and the community. Even fewer defences of retribution make a plausible appeal to the interpersonal practice of apologizing as a symbolically adequate model for criminal justice. This review article considers Christopher Bennett’s engaging defence of an apology ritual in criminal justice, an account of justifiable punishment that draws from the best of retributive and restorative (...) justice theory. (shrink)

Human–wildlife interactions have existed for thousands of years, however as human populations increase and human impact on natural ecosystems becomes more intensive, both parties are increasingly being forced to compete for resources vital to both. Humans can value wildlife in many contexts promoting coexistence, while in other situations, such as crop-raiding, wildlife conflicts with the interests of people. As our closest phylogenetic relatives, chimpanzees in particular occupy a special importance in terms of their complex social and cultural relationship with humans. (...) A case study is presented that focuses on the Bossou chimpanzees’ perspective of their habitat in the Republic of Guinea, West Africa, by highlighting the risks and opportunities presented by a human-dominated landscape, and detailing their day-to-day coexistence with humans. Understanding how rural people perceive chimpanzees and how chimpanzees adapt to living in anthropogenic environments will enhance our understanding of how people-wildlife interactions develop into situations of conflict and therefore can generate sustainable solutions to prevent or mitigate situations of conflict. (shrink)

The quality of a research study application sends a distinct signal to the institutional review board (IRB) about the skills, capacities, preparation, communication, experience, and resources of its authors. However, efforts to research and define IRB application quality have been insufficient. Inattention to the quality of an IRB application is consequential because the application precedes IRB review, and perceptions of quality between the two may be interrelated and interdependent. Without a clear understanding of quality, IRBs do not know how to (...) define quality and researchers do not know how to achieve quality. This position has not been systematically studied to date, and future research could provide much-needed empirical validation. This paper lays the conceptual groundwork for future investigation into what constitutes quality in an IRB application. It includes a landscape review of multidisciplinary research on quality, as well as a discussion of quality frameworks analogous to research with human participants that exist in the published literature. It also examines the background and significance of federal research regulations, regulatory burdens, researchers’ regulatory literacy, and the roles and responsibilities of IRB professionals within this ecosystem. (shrink)

People frequently report that, at times, their thought has a vocal character. Thinking commonly appears to be accompanied or constituted by silently ‘talking’ to oneself in inner speech. In this paper, we explore the specifically epistemic role of inner speech in conscious reasoning. A plausible position—but one I argue is ultimately wrong—is that inner speech plays asolelyfacilitative role that is exhausted by (i) serving as the vehicle of representation for conscious reasoning, and/or (ii) allowing one to focus on certain types (...) of objects or relations, e.g., causal relations, abstracta, counterfactuals, etc., or to consciously entertain structured propositional contents that it would be hard (or impossible) to focus on or entertain with representations in other (e.g., imagistic) formats. According to this position, inner speech doesn't figure as a justificatory element in our reasoning or as the partial epistemic basis of our conclusions—it merely facilitates reasoning through (i) and/or (ii). In contrast to the view that inner speech is amerefacilitator, I establish that (outside of potentially playing roles (i) and/or (ii)) the language we use itself serves as a crucial source of information in reasoning. In other words, we reason from propositions about the language we use in inner speech as opposed to exclusively reasoning from the semantic contents of the speech. My conclusion follows from how we use language as a cognitive tool to keep track of information, e.g., the contents of premises, lemmas, previous reasoning results, etc., in reasoning. (shrink)

In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an (...) interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments. (shrink)

Evidentialism as an account of epistemic justification is the position that a doxastic attitude, D, towards a proposition, p, is justified for an intentional agent, S, at a time, t, iff having D towards p fits S’s evidence at t, where the fittingness of an attitude on one’s evidence is typically analyzed in terms of evidential support for the propositional contents of the attitude. Evidentialism is a popular and well-defended account of justification. In this paper, I raise a problem for (...) evidentialism on the grounds that there can be epistemic circumstances in which a proposition is manifestly and nonmisleadingly supported by an agent’s total evidence, and yet believing the proposition is not justified for the agent. As I argue, in order for an agent to have justification to believe a proposition, it needs to be the case that the belief as possessed by the agent could exhibit certain epistemic good making features, e.g., the propositional content of the belief as possessed by the agent would be supported by the agent’s evidence. As I demonstrate, the fact that a proposition, p, is supported by an agent’s total evidence at a time, t, doesn’t guarantee that a belief in p as possessed by the agent at t could exhibit any epistemic good making features, including having propositional contents (i.e., p) that would be supported by the agent’s evidence. Thus, the fact that a proposition is supported by an agent’s evidence doesn’t guarantee that the agent has justification to believe the proposition. (shrink)

Our conscious thought, at least at times, seems suffused with language. We may experience thinking as if we were “talking in our head”, thus using inner speech to verbalize, e.g., our premises, lemmas, and conclusions. I take inner speech to be part of a larger phenomenon I call inner semiotics, where inner semiotics involves the subjective experience of expressions in a semiotic (or symbol) system absent the overt articulation of the expressions. In this paper, I argue that inner semiotics allows (...) us to bootstrap our way into entertaining thoughts about exact numbers and quantities that we couldn't prior to our competence with a numeric code. I establish that our arithmetic thoughts literally occur as (internal ‘articulations’ of) expressions in a numeric code. However, a problem arises for my view: just as we can slip in overt speech, producing an utterance that deviates from what we mean to say, there is very good evidence that we can slip in inner speech as well. If our arithmetic thought occurs in a numeric code, it's far from clear how we determine when a covert utterance constitutes a slip. In closing, I provide an account of what makes an inner speech utterance a slip. (shrink)

This paper argues that hume's discussion of personal identity in treatise i.Iv.6 is misinterpreted and overrated. Far from seeking a justification for ascribing identity to persons, Hume dismissed all such ascriptions as mistaken; his 'account' in i.Iv.6 is an attempt to explain how the supposed mistake arises. His own criteria of unity/identity, On the strength of which he excludes persons, Are themselves ill-Founded: they are criteria for individuating etc., 'things', The only ones hume, Who failed to grasp locke's point that (...) identity goes with classified items, Was able to find. (shrink)

Individuals shift their language to converge with interlocutors. Recent work has suggested that convergence can target not only observed but also expected linguistic behavior, cued by social information. However, it remains uncertain how expectations and observed behavior interact, particularly when they contradict each other. We investigated this using a cooperative map task experiment, in which pairs of participants communicated online by typing messages to each other in a miniature “alien” language that exhibited variation between alien species. The overall task comprised (...) three phases, in each of which participants were told that they would be paired with a different partner. One member of the pair was given explicit linguistic expectations in each phase, while the software controlled whether or not observed behavior from their partner would be consistent or inconsistent with these expectations. The other participant was given no such expectations, allowing us to control for the role of expectation. Participants converged to both observed and expected linguistic behavior, and convergence was boosted when observation and expectation were aligned. When expected and observed behavior were misaligned, participants updated their expectations, though convergence levels did not drop. Furthermore, participants generalized what they learned about one partner to apparent novel partners of the same alien species. We also discuss individual variation in convergence patterns and the lack of a relationship between linguistic convergence and success at the map task. Findings are consistent with observations outside the laboratory that language users converge toward expected linguistic behavior. They also have broader implications for understanding linguistic accommodation and the influence of social information on linguistic processing and production. (shrink)

AbstractClimate change is a complex, multilevel challenge with implications of failure unimaginable for current and future generations. However, despite the Paris Agreement supporting the imperative for action in an atmosphere of scientific consensus, organisations are failing to take the decisive action required. We argue that this lack of organisational action needs to be addressed by examining the cognitive foundations of managerial decisions on climate change and sustainability. A systematic review of research on cognition, sensemaking and managerial interpretation where it is (...) linked to climate change or sustainability is presented within this article. The results detail a multilevel analysis highlighting key themes and the core concepts from the literature including factors shaping the cognitive process, to elucidate reasons for inaction and potential for promoting change. Through this research, an integrated model is presented demonstrating the interaction of factors, cognitive processes and outcomes. Based on this analysis, potential reasons for inaction are proposed and countered by three potential solutions linked to leadership, social norms and structural reform. (shrink)

Draws on a broad range of scientific evidence to theorize an evolutionary basis for religion, considering how religion may have served as an essential component of early society survival and that the brain may be inherently inclined toward religious behavior.

Engelhardt is correct in thinking that potentiality implies continuity. The central purpose of the Aristotelian notion of potency is to explain continuity, both in becoming and in generation-corruption. If one denies continuity in change, he will have little use for potentiality, at least little use for the Aristotelian types. And there are types that should not be conflated: one to account for continuity in becoming and generation, another to account for continuity of a being going from not acting to acting. (...) The first type, where something happens to a being, is called passive potency; the second type, where a being itself actively does something, is predictably called active potency. (shrink)

David Kaplan’s analysis of the factors that determine what words someone has used in a given utterance requires that a speaker can only use a word through producing an utterance performed with a particular, related intention directed at speaking that word. This account, or any that requires a speaker to have an intention to utter a specific word, proves inconsistent with models of speech planning in psycholinguistics as informed by data on slips-of-the-tongue. Kaplan explicitly aims to formulate a theory of (...) words that elides the details of the processes responsible for speech planning and production. Though it may superficially seem that the picture of speech planning and production offered by psycholinguistics can add no insight into our analysis—on closer inspection—we find a rich body of empirical data that should be integrated into any viable account of what words someone has used in a given utterance. (shrink)

Against the position of professor rex martin ("the review of metaphysics," xxv, December 1971) it is argued that there is a conceptual link between disobedience and destruction of authority, As socrates argues; that socrates does not take obedience to law to be an absolute principle of action; that socrates in the two dialogues about his trial does not contradict himself on the question of obedience to the court; that socrates' argument from piety does not undermine his arguments from injury and (...) agreement. (shrink)

In "Amazing Grace," the best-loved of all hymns, John Newton's allusions to the drama of his life tell the story of a youth who was a virtual slave in Sierra Leone before ironically becoming a slave trader himself. Liverpool, his home port, was the center of the most colossal, lucrative, and inhumane slave trade the world has ever known. A gradual spiritual awakening transformed Newton into an ardent evangelist and anti-slavery activist. Influenced by Methodists George Whitefield and John Wesley, Newton (...) became prominent among those favoring a Methodist-style revival in the Church of England. This movement stressed personal conversion, simple worship, emotional enthusiasm, and social justice. While pastoring a poor flock in Olney, he and poet William Cowper produced a hymnal containing such perennial favorites as "Glorious Things of Thee Are Spoken" and "God Moves in a Mysterious Way." Later, while serving a church in London, Newton raised British consciousness on the immorality of the slave trade. The account he gave to Parliament on the atrocities he had witnessed helped William Wilberforce obtain legislation to abolish the slave trade in England. Newton's life story convinced many who are "found" after being "lost" to sing Gospel hymns as they lobbied for civil rights legislation. His close involvement with both capitalism and evangelicalism, the main economic and religious forces of his era, provide a fascinating case study of the relationship of Christians to their social environment. In an afterword on Newtonian Christianity, Phipps explains Newton's critique of Karl Marx's thesis that religious ideals are always the effect of what produces the most profit. Phipps relies on accounts Newton gives in his ship journal, diary, letters, and sermons for this most readable scholarly narrative. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together specially commissioned essays by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide a state-of-the-art overview of jurisprudential scholarship. Each author presents an account of the contending views and scholarly debates animating their field of enquiry as well as setting the agenda for further study. This landmark publication will be essential reading for anyone working in legal theory and of interest to legal scholars generally, philosophers, and legal theorists (...) looking for a starting point towards understanding current jurisprudential thinking. (shrink)

In an earlier paper on this topic, ‘Eupatridai, Archons, and Areopagus,'3 I was primarily concerned to recover the views of Aristotle, as expressed in the ‘Αθ. πολ., on such elements of Attic Society as Eupatridai, Gennetai, etc. I sought to establish that to him at least these two were not identical: that, more precisely, he recorded two stages of development— ‘Ion’: in whose day the whole body of Athenians was composed of Gennetai, while Eupatridai had not yet been created. ‘Theseus’: (...) who created the Eupatridai—distinguishing them, as a Third Estate, from those two Estates which had hitherto, since Ion, composed the body of Athenians. (shrink)

With the same sense of historical responsibility and veracity he has exemplified in his studies on Voltaire, Ira O. Wade turns now to Voltaire's milieu and begins an account of the French Enlightenment which will explain its genesis, its nature and coherence, and its diffusion in the modern world. To understand the movement of ideas that produced the spirit of the Enlightenment, Mr. Wade identifies and examines the people, events, and rich development of philosophy in the Renaissance and (...) seventeenth century. He considers, in turn, the challenges of the Renaissance and the responses of its leading writers (Rabelais, Bacon, and Montaigne); Baroque thought (Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, the Freethinkers); and Classicism (Moliere, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Newton). Mr. Wade begins his discussion by examining the critical literature on the Enlightenment and concludes with a theoretical chapter, "The Making of a Spirit." As the history of an intellectual culture, his study makes vivid the power of thought in the making of a civilization. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Engineering begins with a design problem: how to make occupants of vehicles safer, settle on an inter-face for an x-ray machine, or create more legible road signs. In choosing any particular solution, engineers must make value choices. By focusing on the solving of these problems, Ethics Within Engineering: An Introduction shows how ethics is at the intellectual core of engineering. Built around a number of engaging case studies, it presents real examples of engineering problems that everyone, engineer or not, will (...) recognize, ranging from such simple artifacts as toasters and the layout of burners and knobs on a stove top to the software responsible for the Colombia airliner crash. (shrink)

Recently, a cottage industry has formed with the goal of analyzing reasoning. The relevant notion of reasoning in which philosophers are expressly interested is fixed through an epistemic functional description: reasoning—whatever it is—is our personal-level, rationally evaluable means of meeting our rational requirements through managing and updating our attitudes. Roughly, the dominant view in the extant literature as developed by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and others is that reasoning is a rule-governed operation over propositional attitudes that results in a change (...) in attitude. In this paper, I argue that our personal-level operations over mental models and visuospatial imagery, which are representations in a non-propositional/analogue format, can be rationally evaluable processes of managing our attitudes and, thus, should be considered reasoning in the relevant sense. Furthermore, I show that if reasoning can occur through operations over mental models and imagery, then the dominant rule-following account mischaracterizes the cognitive operations and representational states assumed to be constitutive of reasoning and what grounds the rational status of a line of reasoning. (shrink)

Evidentialism as an account of theoretical rationality is a popular and well-defended position. However, recently, it's been argued that misleading higher-order evidence (HOE) – that is, evidence about one's evidence or about one's cognitive functioning – poses a problem for evidentialism. Roughly, the problem is that, in certain cases of misleading HOE, it appears evidentialism entails that it is rational to adopt a belief in an akratic conjunction – a proposition of the form “p, but my evidence doesn't support p” (...) – despite it being the case that believing an akratic conjunction appears to be clearly irrational. In this paper, I diffuse the problem for evidentialism using the distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality. I argue that, although it can be propositionally rational to believe an akratic conjunction (according to evidentialism), one cannot inferentially base an akratic belief in one's evidence, and, thus, one cannot doxastically rationally possess an akratic belief. In addition, I address the worry that my solution to the puzzle commits evidentialists to the possibility of epistemic circumstances in which a proposition, p, is propositionally rational to believe (namely, an akratic conjunction), yet one cannot, in principle, (doxastically) rationally believe p. As I demonstrate, cases of misleading HOE are not the only types of cases that force evidentialists to accept that propositional rationality does not entail the possibility of doxastic rationality. There are no new problems raised by misleading HOE that weren't already present in cases involving purely first-order evidence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethical and political attitudes are not randomly distributed in a population. Attitudes of family members, for example, tend to be more similar than those of a random sample of the same size. In the fields of social psychology and political science, the historically standard explanation for these attitude distribution patterns was that social and political attitudes are a function of environmental factors like parental socialization and prevailing social norms. This received view is, however, complicated by more recent work in (...) behavioral genetics, which consistently and repeatedly demonstrates that certain ethical and political attitudes dealing with issues like censorship, abortion, capital punishment, and immigration policy have a significant heritability coefficient, to wit, a substantial percentage of attitude variance in a population can be attributed to genetic variance, independent of environmental factors. In this paper, I argue that the genetic influence on our ethical and political attitudes is mediated by what we can agree to be irrelevant and distorting factors that can lead moral reasoning astray. Further, I argue that we should significantly lower our credences in ethical and political attitudes that fall within the domains of belief that involve significant genetic influence. (shrink)

Pezdek and Lam [Pezdek, K. & Lam, S. . What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study “False memory,” and what are the implications of these choices? Consciousness and Cognition] claim that the majority of research into false memories has been misguided. Specifically, they charge that false memory scientists have been misusing the term “false memory,” relying on the wrong methodologies to study false memories, and misapplying false memory research to real world situations. We review each of these claims (...) and highlight the problems with them. We conclude that several types of false memory research have advanced our knowledge of autobiographical and recovered memories, and that future research will continue to make significant contributions to how we understand memory and memory errors. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to put forward the hypothesis that the author of ‘Herodes περ πολιτας is Kritias. The speech bears Herodes’ name: did Herodes' well-known interest in Kritias amount to the transcription of a whole speech? The speech concerns Thessalian affairs at approximately the time when Kritias was in Thessaly: is it exactly the time? and is the tone what we would expect Kritias' tone to be? We have much description of Kritias' prose style, and a few (...) verbatim fragments: does the style of this speech correspond? (shrink)

‘Service’, particularly ‘domestic service’, operates as a specific articulation or intersection of processes of race, class, gender and age that reiterates images of the sexual desirability of some women racially marked by blackness or indigeneity in Latin America. The sexualisation of racially subordinated people has been linked to the exercise of power. This article focuses on an aspect of subordination related to the condition of being a servant, and the ‘domestication’ and ‘acculturation’ that domestic service implies in societies where black (...) and indigenous people are often linked to ‘backwardness’. Perceived racial otherness, class subordination, gender, age and domesticated servitude together reinforce an erotic image of sexual availability, particularly in younger women. (shrink)

Professor Charles Foster1 argues that the recent decision by the Supreme Court2 on the process of making decisions about medical treatment in people who lack capacity due to a prolonged disorder of consciousness is fostering medical paternalism. He considers that the judgment shows ‘ deference to the guidelines of various organisations ’ and then that ‘ The guidance has effectively become a definitive statement of the relevant obligations,’ concluding that ‘ This usurps the function of the law.’ Healthcare teams make (...) all decisions concerning medical care provided; no-one else can. Both the clinicians themselves, and any guidance provided to them, must comply with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.3 Lady Black’s judgment makes clear that ‘ The basic protective structure is established by the MCA 2005 ’ and that the associated Code of Practice4 ‘ contains valuable guidance ’. She specifically highlights that the decision-maker must ensure that ‘ account has been taken of the patient’s previously expressed wishes and those of people close to him, as well as the opinions of other medical personnel. The MCA 2005 requires this to happen, and is reinforced by the professional guidance available to doctors.’ The Act says: ‘ He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 1. the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in …. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Playing the Blues Defining the Blues Wittgenstein to the Rescue Good Blues, Bad Blues, Walking Dead Blues Notes.

Although epistasis is at the center of the Fisher-Wright debate, biologists not involved in the controversy are often unaware that there are actually two different formal definitions of epistasis. We compare concepts of genetic independence in the two theoretical traditions of evolutionary genetics, population genetics and quantitative genetics, and show how independence of gene action (represented by the multiplicative model of population genetics) can be different from the absence of gene interaction (represented by the linear additive model of quantitative genetics). (...) The two formulations converge with weak selection but not with strong selection or, for multiple loci, when the aggregated interaction terms are not negligible. As a result of the different formulations of gene interaction, the presence or absence of linkage disequilibrium,/D/, does not necessarily indicate the presence or absence of fitness epistasis. Indeed, linkage disequilibrium is generated in ‘additive’ models in quantitative genetics whenever two (or more) loci experience simultaneous selection. As a research strategy, it is often practical, for theoretical or experimental reasons, to minimize gene interaction by assuming independence of gene action in regard to fitness, or by assuming linear additive effects of multiple loci on a phenotype. However, minimizing the role of epistasis in theoretical investigations hinders our understanding of the origins of diversity and the evolution of complex phenotypes. (shrink)

Every human activity has its characteristic features, the general tendencies that are often difficult to perceive for those engaged in the activity. Such general tendencies are of special concern to those managing in such activities, whether one is coaching soccer or running a corporation, for only with knowledge of such tendencies can one engage in intelligent managing and, more important, intelligent moral action. For the activity of business is not value-neutral, and if one is to manage morally in business, one (...) must come to understand its general tendencies insofar as they affect values. (shrink)